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INTRODUCTION
In April 2021, Neuralink, Elon Musk’s neurotechnology company,
released a YouTube video purporting to show a monkey playing the video
game Pong using his thoughts instead of a handheld controller.1 According
to voiceover narration in the video, the monkey was able to do this thanks to
an implanted device called a “Neuralink” that allows the brain to
communicate directly with technology outside the brain. 2 The company has
tested a version of the device in pigs but not in humans.3
Musk has been vocal about his hopes for Neuralink technology. In a
series of tweets, he predicted that the first Neuralink products “will enable
someone with paralysis to use a smartphone with their mind faster than
someone using thumbs” while “[l]ater versions will be able to shunt signals
from Neuralinks in brain to Neuralinks in body motor/sensory neuron
clusters, thus enabling, for example, paraplegics to walk again.” 4 For those
worried about what a Neuralink might feel like, he added that the “device is
implanted flush with the skull” so users will “feel totally normal.”5
Most research into brain-computer communication focuses on giving
people with limited motor function more control over their environment. But
Musk thinks that Neuralink has potential as a consumer product, too. 6
Facebook, not to be left out of the fun, announced development of a
commercially available thought-to-text device around the same time Musk
announced Neuralink. Facebook has since abandoned plans for such a device
in favor of a virtual reality controller that uses similar technology but “has a
nearer-term path to market.”7
Elizabeth Lopatto, Watch: Elon Musk’s Neuralink Says This Monkey is Playing Pong with
Its Mind, THE VERGE (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/8/22374749/elonmusk-neuralink-monkey-pong-brain-interface [https://perma.cc/F5RP-HBZS].
2
Id.
3
Tanya Lewis, Elon Musk’s Pig-Brain Implant Is Still a Long Way from ‘Solving Paralysis’,
SCI. AM. (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/elon-musks-pig-brainimplant-is-still-a-long-way-from-solving-paralysis/ [https://perma.cc/H926-76BD].
4
Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (Apr. 8, 2021, 8:24 PM), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/
status/1380315654524301315?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwt
erm%5E1380315654524301315%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F
%2Fwww.theverge.com%2F2021%2F4%2F8%2F22374749%2Felon-musk-neuralinkmonkey-pong-brain-interface [https://perma.cc/9VFT-62NL].
5
Id.
6
Id.; see also Applications, NEURALINK, https://neuralink.com/applications/
[https://perma.cc/NY9J-4ZGH] (last visited Jan. 7, 2022) (“This technology has the potential
. . . eventually to expand how we interact with each other, with the world, and with
ourselves.”).
7
Antonio Regalado, Facebook is Ditching Plans to Make an Interface that Reads the Brain,
MIT TECH. REV. (July 14, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/07/14/1028447/
1
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An increasing number of neurotechnology-focused companies have
appeared over the past decade or so.8 In case you would prefer not to wear a
health tracker on your wrist, many of these companies offer FitBit-like
products that you wear on your head.9 Some of this consumer
neurotechnology stimulates the brain with electrical signals. 10 Other products
allow the user to interact with the outside world, to a limited degree, using
their thoughts alone.11 Most, however, are best understood as health
trackers—they record a sampling of your brain waves and send that sampling
to an app which tells you (in theory) how you are feeling or offers some other
insight into your health.12
These consumer products cannot “read minds” in the way most of us
understand the phrase. They cannot delve into your psyche to provide a
nuanced report of your emotions.13 They need a lot of assistance to play the
“guess the number I’m thinking” game. 14 Unlike their lab-based cousins, they
facebook-brain-reading-interface-stops-funding/ [https://perma.cc/XZQ2-232H]. Facebook’s funding did find some success, however. In 2021, a Facebook-funded team
announced it had “decode[d] words and sentences directly from the cerebral cortical activity”
of someone unable to speak (i.e., anarthria) with a neuroprosthesis and deep-learning
algorithms. David A. Moses, Sean L. Metzger, Jessie R. Liu, Gopala K. Anumanchipalli,
Joseph G. Makin, Pengfei F. Sun, Josh Chartier, Maximilian E. Dougherty, Patricia M. Liu,
Gary M. Abrams, Adelyn Tu-Chan, Karunesh Ganguly & Edward F. Chang,
Neuroprosthesis for Decoding Speech in a Paralyzed Person with Anarthria, 385 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 217, 217 (2021).
8
Cathy Hackl, Meet Ten Companies Working on Reading Your Thoughts (and Even Those
of Your Pets), FORBES (June 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cathyhackl/2020/06
/21/meet-10-companies-working-on-reading-your-thoughts-and-even-those-of-your-pets/
?sh=44508082427c [https://perma.cc/33RX-B3LZ].
9
Id.
10
Anna Wexler & Peter B. Reiner, Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Neurotechnologies, 363
SCIENCE 234 (2019).
11
The Force Trainer II: Hologram Experience, NEUROSKY, https://store.neurosky.com/
#other-products [https://perma.cc/L6DK-GCRP] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021) (“Use the power
of your mind to move holograms and perform amazing feats of Jedi strength from different
Star Wars movies. Real brainwave sensors on the wireless headset detect the strength of your
concentration from your brainwaves and trigger changes in the hologram.”).
12
E.g., Choose Muse, MUSE, https://choosemuse.com/ [https://perma.cc/767L-XA2M] (last
visited Jan. 7, 2021) [hereinafter MUSE].
13
Anna Wexler & Robert Thibault, Mind-Reading or Misleading? Assessing Direct-toConsumer Electroencephalography (EEG) Devices Marketed for Wellness and Their Ethical
and Regulatory Implications, 3 J. COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT 131, 134–35 (2019).
14
See Jordan J. Bird, Diego R. Faria, Luis J. Manso, Anikó Ekárt & Christopher D.
Buckingham, A Deep Evolutionary Approach to Bioinspired Classifier Optimisation for
Brain-Machine Interaction, 2019 C OMPLEXITY 4316548 (2019), at 12, https://www.
hindawi.com/journals/complexity/2019/4316548/
[https://perma.cc/VC5X-EU3Z]
(reporting that a novel computational model, using a brain signal dataset developed with the
Muse headband, could generate accurate guesses in a number-guessing experiment less than
forty percent of the time).
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cannot produce fuzzy reconstructions of what a user sees by measuring
signals from a part of the brain’s visual cortex. 15
Nevertheless, these consumer neurotechnology products may be
dangerous.16 As FDA’s mandate covers “medical devices” but not “wellness
devices,” many of these products go unregulated. 17 Not every
“neurotechnology” product is deserving of the label. Neurotechnology
companies often over-sell their products, promising everything from better
sleep to higher intelligence. 18 These are current, pressing issues. The market
for these products is growing—fast. Regulation and more attention from
policymakers are sorely needed. 19
But ensuring that regulation is effective will be a tall order. Devices
that enable direct communication between the brain and computers are a
large, complex, and quickly developing class of neurotechnologies. Although
few are capable of anything near “mind reading,” media coverage of
Neuralink and research breakthroughs has inspired widespread anxiety that
private thoughts will soon be publicly accessible. This mix of complex
technology, real-life advances, and sci-fi expectations makes it hard to pin
down what these devices are—and what they are really capable of. How do
you regulate technologies that seem to elude definition?
Bryan Casey and Mark A. Lemley have an idea. In You Might Be A
Robot, they argue that when it comes to regulating robots or artificial
intelligence, trying to pinpoint an objective definition leads to underregulation, over-regulation, and rapid obsolescence. 20 They suggest
regulating conduct instead of trying to find the perfect definition of “robot”—
in other words, regulating “verbs, not nouns” by developing functional
criteria in place of exact definitions. 21 When it is really necessary to decide
whether something is a robot, they propose making case-by-case
15

Shinji Nishimoto, An T. Vu, Thomas Naselaris, Yuval Benjamini, Bin Yu & Jack L.
Gallant, Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by Natural Movies,
21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1641, 1646 (2011). See also Moises Velasquez-Manoff, The Brain
Implants that Could Change Humanity, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/08/28/opinion/sunday/brain-machine-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.
cc/N82Z-U9FG] (describing experiment and limitations of currently available consumer
technologies).
16
See Marcello Ienca, Pim Haselager & Ezekiel J Emanuel, Brain Leaks and Consumer
Neurotechnology, 36 BIOTECHNOLOGY & NATURE 805, 805 (2018) (arguing that “[g]reater
safeguards are needed to address the personal safety, security and privacy risks arising from
increasing adoption of neurotechnology in the consumer realm”).
17
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES 2 (2019)
[hereinafter POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES].
18
Anna Wexler & Robert Thibault, supra note 13, at 133.
19
Id. at 136; Marcello Ienca, Pim Haselager & Ezekiel J Emanuel, supra note 16, at 808–10.
20
Bryan Casey & Mark A. Lemley, You Might Be a Robot, 105 C ORNELL L. REV. 287 (2020)
[hereinafter You Might Be a Robot].
21
You Might Be a Robot, supra note 20, at 342.
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determinations and striving to keep definitions “as short term and contingent
as possible.”22 Regulators and courts, they argue, are better equipped to make
such determinations than legislatures. 23 If specific legislation is ever needed,
legislators should add safeguards that allow them to adjust provisions to keep
up with ever-evolving technology.24
“Brain-computer communication device” may be a little easier to
define than “robot,” if only because it encompasses a smaller group of
things.25 However, depending on one’s point of view, “brain-computer
communication device” may be overbroad or too narrow. This comment uses
the term “brain-computer interface” (BCI) because it is common in both
expert and non-expert writings about this technology. (You probably
gathered that from the title.) The broad use of BCI here is meant to ease
reading, not as an argument about what the scope of the term should be in
papers dealing with the technical aspects of connecting brains with
computers. This is not one of those papers.
This comment explores the application of Casey and Lemley’s thesis
to the definitional problem that devices described above present. Part I
surveys recent developments in BCI technology, the limits of currently
available consumer BCIs, and the challenges of regulating emergent
technologies. It concludes with an overview of growing concerns about the
privacy risks of BCIs—a “privacy narrative”—that whether true,
exaggerated, or somewhere in between is a big reason why defining “BCI”
for regulatory purposes is difficult. Part II delves into You Might Be A Robot
and makes the case for treating BCIs the way Casey and Lemley propose
robots should be treated. It also adds “affect” to Casey and Lemley’s list of
suggested functional criteria for robot regulation. Affect is a consideration of
the way that people are likely to react to a given technology, such as a robot
police dog or a BCI device. Because affect can differ significantly from
“agenda”—that is, what a technology is actually meant to do—it may be a
useful tool for effectively regulating new technologies like BCIs.
I. NEURONS AND NARRATIVES
This section will first provide a brief scenic tour of the basics of BCI
technology, recent developments, and the limits of currently available
consumer BCI products. I will then present a brief explanation for why
regulating BCIs and similar technologies can be difficult. My goal here is
twofold. First, I hope to demystify BCIs, if only slightly. Second, I aim to lay
22

Id. at 295.
Id.
24
Id.
25
See infra Part II.
23
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a foundation for Part II by introducing the gap between what BCIs can do and
what people think they can do. This gap, I argue in Part II, likely will require
regulators and industry actors to take affect—how people respond
emotionally to something—into account when (self-)regulating.
A. Brain-Computer Interfaces
1. What are they?
Neuralink is not the first company to develop devices that connect
brains and computers. The basic technology is older than you might think.
Back in 1973, UCLA professor Jacques Vidal published “Toward Direct
Brain-Computer Communication” in the Annual Review of Biophysics and
Bioengineering.26 Since then, research teams have developed a number of
“thought-to-application” devices, including “thought-controlled” robotic
arms and drones.27 A few have investigated ways of “writing” the brain, such
as controlling epileptic seizures.28 In mid-2020, a team associated with the
long-running BrainGate project announced that they had created a device that
could translate the user’s imagined handwriting movements into text in real
time.29 In early 2021, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
authorized marketing the “Neurolutions IpsiHand Upper Extremity
Rehabilitation System” for people with reduced hand, wrist, or arm

26

Jacques J. Vidal, Toward Direct Brain-Computer Communication, 2 ANN. REV.
BIOPHYSICS & BIOENGINEERING 157 (1973).
27
E.g., BrainGate Publication Timelines, BRAINGATE (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.braingate.
org/publications-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/3S25-SARE]; Emily Durham, First-Ever
Noninvasive Mind-Controlled Robotic Arm, CARNEGIE MELLON C. ENGINEERING (June 20,
2019), https://engineering.cmu.edu/news-events/news/2019/06/20-he-sci-robotics.html
[https://perma.cc/5P45-8YMY].
28
Liam Drew, Agency and the Algorithm, 571 NATURE S19 (2019).
29
Francis R. Willett, Donald T. Avansino, Leigh R. Hochberg, Jaimie M. Henderson &
Krishna V. Shenoy:
Here, we demonstrate an intracortical BCI that can decode imagined
handwriting movements from neural activity in motor cortex and translate
it to text in real-time, using a novel recurrent neural network decoding
approach. With this BCI, our study participant (whose hand was
paralyzed) achieved typing speeds that exceed those of any other BCI yet
reported: 90 characters per minute at >99% accuracy with a generalpurpose autocorrect. These speeds are comparable to able-bodied
smartphone typing speeds in our participant’s age group (115 characters
per minute) and significantly close the gap between BCI-enabled typing
and able-bodied typing rates.
High-Performance Brain-to-Text Communication via Handwriting, 593 NATURE 249, 249
(2021).
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movement caused by a stroke. 30 This prescription-only system records a
user’s brain activity, analyzes it to determine what muscle movement the user
intended, and then signals a hand brace to move the user’s hand
accordingly.31
It should be noted that experts tend to use the term BCI to describe a
smaller group of devices than non-experts do. At a high level of generality, a
BCI is a device that allows a brain and a computer to directly interface, or
connect, with each other. BCIs overlap in form and function with other kinds
of neurotechnology, such as neurostimulation 32, neuroimaging33, and multipurpose wearable health trackers.34 Neuroimaging does not involve
connecting brains and computers unless you really stretch the meaning of
“connect.” However, the line between devices that virtually everyone agrees
are BCIs and other neurotechnologies can be fuzzy. Many experts, but not
all, distinguish neurostimulation and BCIs. 35 Wearable health trackers that
use EEG (electroencephalography) are usually classified as BCIs, but
trackers that indirectly measure brain activity, such as through blood oxygen
measurements, may not be. In a 2014 workshop, FDA defined BCIs as
“neuroprostheses that interface with the central or peripheral nervous system
to restore lost motor or sensory capabilities.” 36 This definition covers
IpsiHand, but it obviously does not cover devices that are meant to give their
users capabilities beyond those that are biologically possible, such as the
Muse headband or Neuralink.
This is not to say that FDA’s definition is wrong, or that any definition
is wrong. Rather, I mention this fuzziness to lay the foundation for the second
Part of this comment. In “You Might Be A Robot,” Casey and Lemley present
a comprehensive overview of the challenges facing policymakers, regulators,
and pretty much everyone else who tries to come up with a perfect definition
of “robot.”37 I do not have room for a similarly comprehensive overview of
the challenges of defining “BCI.” Accordingly, this Comment uses “a device
30

Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes Marketing of Device to Facilitate
Muscle Rehabilitation in Stroke Patients (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-authorizes-marketing-device-facilitate-musclerehabilitation-stroke-patients [https://perma.cc/5RGW-5R6B].
31
Id.
32
Anna Wexler & Robert Thibault, supra note 13; Ienca et al., supra note 16.
33
Ienca et al., supra note 16.
34
Karola V. Kreitmair, Dimensions of Ethical Direct-to-Consumer Neurotechnologies, 10
AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 152, 154 (2019).
35
Anna Wexler & Robert Thibault, supra note 13; Ienca et al., supra note 16. But see
Kreitmair, supra note 34 (including VR devices in survey of neurotechnologies).
36
FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DISCUSSION PAPER: BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACE
(BCI) DEVICES FOR PATIENTS WITH PARALYSIS AND AMPUTATION 3 (2014),
https://www.fda.gov/media/116776/download#page=3 [https://perma.cc/5L6W-K9ZD].
37
Bryan Casey & Mark A. Lemley, supra note 20, at 342.
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that allows a brain and a computer to interface directly” as a working
definition.
2. How do they work?
Most BCIs share a few basic components: hardware that physically
interfaces with the brain (including the electrode array); an electrical amp;
analytic software to detect brain activity; and communication and feedback
monitoring systems.38 BCIs with these components usually rely on EEG or
another method of detecting electrical brain activity. 39 Some BCIs, however,
use nonelectric detection methods such as fNIRs and fMRIs.40 These measure
“task-induced blood oxygen-level dependent responses,” which correlate
with brain activity.41
BCIs of all types often employ machine learning algorithms—
artificial intelligence (AI)—to classify brain signals and turn those signals
into an output, such as moving a cursor on a computer screen. 42 AI can also
serve an “auto-complete” or “auto-correct” function to increase a BCI’s
accuracy.43
BCIs that use electrodes can detect various kinds of electrical brain
activity, with various levels of accuracy, depending on where the electrodes
are placed. 44 As you might expect, invasive (internal) BCIs receive better

38

OWEN D. JONES, JEFFERY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 825–
28 (2d ed. 2021); see Andreas Wolkenstein, Ralf J. Jox & Orsolya Friedrich, Brain-Computer
Interfaces: Lessons to be Learned from the Ethics of Algorithms, 27 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 636, 636 (2018) (describing BCIs as consisting of four elements: (1)
the user’s generation of brain signals; (2) “the measurement of these signals”; (3) “the
decoding of the measured brain signals”; and (4) “the output commands that direct a given
external device”).
39
JONES et al., supra note 38.
40
Ranganatha Sitaram, Sangkyun Lee & Niels Birbaumer, BCIs That Use Brain Metabolic
Signals, in BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 301 (Jonathan
Wolpaw & Elizabeth Winter Wolpaw eds., 2012).
41
Id.
42
See Wolkenstein, Jox & Friedrich, supra note 38, at 636–37 (listing the steps of BCI
functioning in which algorithms may be found).
43
Id. at 637. See infra Part II (for a more in-depth discussion of the benefits and risks of this
particular use of AI).
44
JONES et al., supra note 38, at 826. See Wolkenstein, Jox & Friedrich, supra note 38, at
636, noting the common division of BCIs into three categories:
[A]ctive BCIs in which the user intentionally produces certain brain states
(e.g., motor imagery) that the BCIs learn to connect with the intended
output; reactive BCIs in which the user is presented with certain (mostly
visual or auditive) stimuli while the BCI measures a particular reactive
brain signal; and passive BCIs in which the user’s brain activity is
monitored and action is taken as soon as a predefined state occurs.
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signals from the brain than noninvasive (external) BCIs.45 Invasive BCIs
employ electrode arrays that sit in the brain. They can “read” the activity of
a small group of neurons or even a single neuron.46 This requires delicate,
invasive surgery to place the electrodes near the target neurons.47 In contrast,
noninvasive BCIs employ EEG sensors that do not penetrate the skull. These
BCIs “read” the activity of a large group of neurons.48 There are also BCIs
that employ ECoGs, which sit on top of the brain under the skull, as
compromise between internal and external BCIs.49
It is easier to get detailed signals when a skull is not in between the
sensor and the targeted neurons. More detailed signals produce better outputs.
This means that, in general, invasive BCIs are capable of more complex tasks
than noninvasive BCIs. For example, someone using an external BCI may be
able to slowly move a robot arm in four directions after intensive training.
Using an internal BCI, that same person may be able to move a robot arm,
after less training, in more than four directions with similar speed and fluidity
as a person with no motor challenges can move their own arm.50
Researchers are still working to determine whether signal detail alone
limits the BCI user’s control of the device. 51 In addition, both academic and
commercial labs have increasingly turned to machine learning—a type of
AI—to create BCIs capable of carrying out more complex tasks.52 Machine
learning allows noninvasive BCIs to take in less precise signals and guess
what detail is missing. This ability to interpret brain signals is a big reason
why BCIs are a high-potential, high-risk technology. While machine learning
has yet to allow noninvasive BCIs to surpass invasive BCIs when it comes to
complex tasks, it will likely have a major impact on the type of noninvasive
BCIs available to consumers in the near future.
Certain brain activity signals are particularly suited for BCIs: P300
event-related potentials; sensorimotor rhythms; steady-state visual evoked

45

JONES et al., supra note 38.
John P. Donoghue, BCIs That Use Signals Recorded in Motor Cortex, in BRAINCOMPUTER INTERFACES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 278 (Jonathan Wolpaw & Elizabeth
Winter Wolpaw eds., 2012); Hansjörg Scherberger, BCIs That Use Signals Recorded in
Parietal or Premotor Cortex, in BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
293 (Jonathan Wolpaw & Elizabeth Winter Wolpaw eds., 2012).
47
Donoghue, supra note 46.
48
Gerwin Schalk, BCIs That Use Electrocorticographic Activity, in BRAIN-COMPUTER
INTERFACES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 251 (Jonathan Wolpaw & Elizabeth Winter Wolpaw
eds., 2012).
49
Id.
50
Schalk, supra note 48, at 257.
51
Id. at 257–59.
52
See, e.g., Durham, supra note 27; Schalk, supra note 48, at 257.
46
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potentials; and error-related negative evoked potentials.53 Although the
particulars of these signals are of limited importance to this Comment’s main
purpose, I offer a brief overview of each to illuminate which BCIs are likely
to enter the consumer market in the near future, which are not, and what
functionality BCIs actually offer. As researchers continue to uncover more
about the brain and what it can tell us about the mind, other brain signal types
may come to the fore.
P300 event-related potentials appear at the scalp 250 to 700
milliseconds after someone detects that a rare or desired event has occurred. 54
Finding and clicking on the internet browser on your computer generates a
P300 potential, as does hearing a song you recognize. P300-based BCIs are
portable, have inexpensive hardware, require minimal training, and take only
minutes to set up for a new user.55 Although P300-based BCIs are rare on the
consumer market, they could be employed as direct-to-consumer thought-totext devices.
Over the course of decades, neuroscientists discovered and then
confirmed an association between voluntary movements and specific wave
frequencies now known as sensorimotor rhythms (SMRs).56 More research
uncovered a correlation between SMRs and imagining movement, clearing
the way for the development of SMR-based BCIs.57 Unlike P300-based BCIs,
which track an involuntary response, SMR-based BCIs require users to think
about something specific. 58 This can require substantial training for both the
user and the BCI.59 Developers must also ensure that the BCI is programmed
to distinguish the targeted SMRs from electrical activity produced by muscles
in the scalp, face, and neck. 60 Despite these drawbacks, SMR-based BCIs
could work well for people who are missing limbs or have limited mobility. 61
Anastasia Greenberg, Inside the Mind’s Eye: An International Perspective on Data
Privacy Law in the Age of Brain-Machine Interfaces, 29 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 84
(2019).
54
Eric W. Sellers, Yael Arbel, Emanuel Donchin, BCIs That Use P300 Event-Related
Potentials, in BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 216 (ed. Jonathan
Wolpaw & Elizabeth Winter Wolpaw) (2012).
55
Id. at 215.
56
Gert Pfurtscheller & Dennis J. McFarland, BCIs That Use Sensorimotor Rhythms, in
BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 227 (Jonathan Wolpaw &
Elizabeth Winter Wolpaw eds., 2012).
57
Id. at 228.
58
Id.; Wexler & Thibault, supra note 13, at 134–35.
59
Pfurtscheller & McFarland, supra note 56, at 233.
60
Id. at 231.
61
Brendan Z. Allison, Josef Faller & Christa Neuper, BCIs That Use Steady-State Visual
Evoked Potentials or Slow Cortical Potentials, in BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 241 (Jonathan Wolpaw & Elizabeth Winter Wolpaw eds., 2012).
Certain SMR-BCIs may also work better than P300-based BCIs for “thought-to-text”
53
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Steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEPs) appear 70 to 100
milliseconds after someone detects a repetitive visual stimulus, such as a
flashing light.62 SSVEP-based BCIs usually depend on the user’s control of
their gaze, so they do not work for people who have trouble moving their
eyes.63 For people who do have control of their gaze, SSVEP-based BCIs are
straightforward to use—no need to imagine movement—but the flickering
stimuli may be annoying.64
Error-related negative evoked potentials (ERNs) appear 50 to 200
milliseconds after someone detects that an event does not match what they
intended to do.65 ERNs are useful as secondary signals to help a BCI’s
algorithm correct problems when the user is not able to produce their desired
outcome.66
3. Limits of Available Consumer BCI Technology
As mentioned above, the BCIs currently available to consumers are
simple external BCIs.67 By and large, they are sleek, futuristic-looking
headbands that record EEG data much like a FitBit records your heart rate. 68
The functionality of these BCIs is limited by “internal” technological
constraints, such as signal quality and user compatibility, and “external”
constraints, such as the resource-intensive nature of BCI development and
regulatory approval processes. There is also the ever-present risk that BCI
development, regulation, and use will aggravate existing disparities,
particularly those of race, gender, and ability. Conventional EEG electrodes,
for example, do not work well with curly or tightly coiled hair, so researchers
tend to exclude potential participants with those hair textures. 69 As a result,
Black people are often underrepresented in EEG-based studies.70

applications because they are more amenable to multi-directional control, which lets users
pick letters faster. Id. at 246.
62
Id. at 241.
63
Id. at 244.
64
Id.
65
Greenberg, supra note 53, at 86.
66
Id. at 87.
67
One can argue that some FDA-regulated implants are BCIs, but for the purposes of this
comment I understand a consumer product to be one that can be purchased and used “off the
shelf” without the need for a medical procedure.
68
See, e.g., MUSE, supra note 12.
69
Tricia Choy, Elizabeth Baker & Katherine Stavropoulos, Systemic Racism in EEG
Research: Considerations and Potential Solutions, 3 AFFECTIVE SCI. 14, 15 (2022).
70
Id. at 15–16.
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Of particular concern are the ways in which machine learning
algorithms replicate biases, both explicit and implicit.71 AI’s bad track record
with facial (non)recognition is just now entering public discourse. 72 But facial
(non)recognition is just the tip of a large and dangerous iceberg. Even if
developers managed to create a truly neutral algorithm, there is still the risk
that the collection and aggregation of data allows a human to make biased
decisions.73 The replication of human biases is further explored in Part II of
this comment; the rest of this section focuses on the other limitations
mentioned above.
The most significant limit of currently available consumer BCIs may
be better labeled as a misconception: They are not mind-reading devices.
BCIs cannot tell you much about your brain. They can tell you even less about
your mind.74 Despite the proliferation of claims implying the contrary, most
consumer BCIs do not employ research-grade EEG.75 Even if they did, EEG
is not a fine enough tool to probe the details of our thoughts with much
accuracy outside of the well-controlled parameters of a research
experiment.76 While SMRs tell you that someone is moving a limb (or
thinking about moving a limb), other signals such as the P300 reveal little
without extra information about the stimuli that evoked them. 77 Studies
71

Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan on AI and objectivity:
Objectivity is not one of AI's virtues. Rather, algorithms reflect back the
biases in the programming that are input when models are designed and in
the data used to train them. Additionally, while data analysis can identify
relationships between behaviors and other variables, relationships are not
always indicative of causality. Therefore, some data analysis can develop
imperfect information caused by algorithmic limitations or biased
sampling. As a result, decisions made by AI may intensify rather than
remove human biases contrary to popular conception. This poses real risks
for equality and democracy.
Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, YALE J.L. & TECH. 108, 158 (2019);
Wolkenstein, Jox & Friedrich, supra note 38, at 637–39 (summarizing the major ethical
issues that algorithm use poses, including a lack of transparency, mistaking correlation for
causation, and both user- and tech-generated biases).
72
See generally CODED BIAS (Shalini Kantayya 2020) (“When MIT Media Lab researcher
Joy Buolamwini discovers that most facial-recognition software misidentifies women and
darker-skinned faces, she delves into an investigation of widespread bias in algorithms.”).
73
CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 15–31 (2016).
74
In part because neuroscientists still are not sure about the relationship between the brain
(the physical organ) and the mind (the concept of consciousness, identity, and those things
that keep philosophers up at night).
75
Iris Coates McCall & Anna Wexler, Peering into the Mind? The Ethics of Consumer
Neuromonitoring Devices, in DEVELOPMENTS IN NEUROETHICS AND BIOETHICS 1, 5 (Vol. 3,
2020)
76
Id. at 16.
77
Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
653, 679–87 (2013).
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demonstrating retrieval of personal information from a consumer BCI often
involve looking at the raw EEG data alongside contextual information about
the user’s environment gathered from another source. 78 For a consumer P300and ERN-based BCI to provide information about a user’s responses to
Facebook advertisements, for example, it would likely require some means
of data sharing with Facebook or a supplementary mechanism that detected
the content of the user’s Facebook activity. 79 The need for supplementary
information is a fact of life for the majority of BCIs currently in existence,
both consumer and research. Kernel, a neurotechnology company launched
in 2016, developed a BCI algorithm called “Sound ID” that can identify what
song someone is listening to in under thirty seconds. 80 From one perspective,
this is an extraordinary advance. For those worried about next-gen
eavesdropping, however, take heart. The experiment that the Kernel team ran
to test “Sound ID” only included ten songs.81
In addition to a lack of mind-reading powers, BCIs are also limited
by the available mechanisms for picking up brain signals. External BCIs have
a signal quality constraint—picking up brain signals through the skull is like
listening to someone talking on the other side of a wall. Internal BCIs,
meanwhile, can get up close and personal with the brain but are poor
candidates for widespread consumer use. Although surgeons across the world
insert cochlear implants and pacemakers every day, brain surgery carries a
number of inherent risks. And as humankind has relatively little experience
sticking hardware in people’s brains, the long-term biocompatibility of
internal BCIs is still an open question. 82 It may be physically infeasible to
craft an internal BCI that needs minimal updates and lasts long enough to
make the surgery worth it. Researchers have limited tools, as “wait and see”
experiments are ethically impermissible. Private companies are not held to
the same research ethics standards as academic institutions. One would
Studies demonstrating remote “brain hacking” indicate that it is physically feasible.
However, there is scholarly disagreement over the level of actual risk current technology
poses. Compare Anna Wexler, Separating Neuroethics from Neurohype, 37 Nature
Biotechnology 990 (2019), with Marcello Ienca & Pim Haselager, Hacking the Brain: BrainComputer Interfacing Technology and the Ethics of Neurosecurity, 18 Ethics & Information
Technology 117 (2016), and Marcello Ienca, Pim Haselager & Ezekiel J Emanuel, Reply to
“Separating Neuroethics from Neurohype,” 37 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 991 (2019).
79
See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 94.
80
Hello Humanity, KERNEL, https://www.kernel.com/hello-humanity.pdf#Experiments
[https://perma.cc/8ZR7-9WL3].
81
Id.
82
See, e.g., MONIKA GOSS-VARLEY, KEITH R. DONA, JUSTIN A. MCMAHON, ANDREW J.
SHOFSTALL, EVON S. EREIFEJ, SYDNEY C. LINDNER & JEFREY R. CAPADONA, SCIENTIFIC
REPORTS, MICROELECTRODE IMPLANTATION IN MOTOR CORTEX CAUSES FINE MOTOR
DEFICIT: IMPLICATIONS ON POTENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS TO BRAIN COMPUTER INTERFACING
AND HUMAN AUGMENTATION, at 2 (2017).
78
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hope—perhaps in vain—that industry pressures and the threat of government
action, if not a sense of moral opprobrium, would be enough to stop firms
looking to cut corners.
To make things more difficult for BCIs, brain signals of the same
general type differ between people and can even differ over time in the same
individual.83 This means that both the user and the BCI must be trained to
“recognize” each other. 84 For many tasks, this training process requires a
skilled technician to assist the user each time they connect to the BCI. Some
BCIs may need regular calibrations to work properly—if they work at all.85
One study found that roughly a fifth of people who tested SMR-based BCIs
could not control them.86 A greater percentage of testers across studies have
successfully used P300- and SSVEP-based BCIs, but researchers are still
trying to create a “universal” BCI. 87 Rather than fine-tune sensors that target
one kind of signal, many researchers have instead tried to supplement them
with additional sensors targeting other signals, both electric and nonelectric.88 While this effort has generated some success, the resulting BCIs
are even more complex, which makes them more difficult to build, study, and
use than BCIs that target one signal type.89
As the preceding paragraphs should make clear, BCI development
and production is resource intensive. This need for resources is another limit
on the availability of consumer BCI technology. External BCIs that allow
users to interact with the world, rather than simply collect EEG data, require
costly equipment. Internal BCI development poses substantial ethical and
bioengineering challenges. Furthermore, private companies looking to get in
the consumer BCI market early have to contend with the spectre of the Food
and Drug Administration’s costly premarket approval process. 90 Most
investors are wary of putting money into the development of products that
are unlikely to appear on shelves.91
FDA requires premarket approval for devices in “Class III,” which
covers devices “that support or sustain human life, are of substantial
83

Inchul Choi, Ilsun Rhiu, Yushin Lee, Myung Hwan Yun, & Chang S. Nam, A Systematic
Review of Hybrid Brain-Computer Interfaces: Taxonomy and Usability Perspectives, 12
PLOS ONE 2 (2017).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 2–3.
90
Premarket Approval: When a PMA is Required, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions-selecting-and-preparingcorrect-submission/premarket-approval-pma#when [https://perma.cc/TU7R-HKWU] (last
updated May 16, 2019).
91
See Wexler & Reiner, supra note 10, at 3.

Vol. 7:2]

Mind Games

405

importance in preventing impairment of human health, or which present a
potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” 92 BCIs could conceivably
fall under all three descriptions of Class III devices.93 Companies can attempt
to evade, and do evade, FDA’s jurisdiction by claiming that a device supports
wellness rather than health. 94 FDA’s device regulation division, the Center
for Devices and Radiological Health, issued a guidance document in 2016
that announced a decision not to examine “low risk general wellness
devices.”95 This is no guarantee for would-be consumer BCI developers,
however. Guidance documents are non-binding and can be changed without
a public notice and comment process.96 Even without a change, at least some
external BCIs may not qualify as low risk. The relevant language in the 2016
guidance document is broad: If a device is invasive, or implanted, or
“involve[s] an intervention or technology that may pose a risk to the safety
of users and other persons if specific regulatory controls are not applied,” the
device is not low risk. 97 In addition, a low risk device cannot be similar to a
device that FDA actively regulates. 98 Accordingly, FDA regulation of any
particular BCI is far from a sure bet, FDA disinterest in BCIs is not a foregone
conclusion, either.
B. Why Regulating BCIs is Challenging
1. The Pacing Problem
Government agencies often lack the resources and expertise necessary
to keep up with BCIs and other rapidly developing technologies. When
agencies do try to curb industry behavior, the resulting regulations can be

92

Premarket Approval: When a PMA is Required, supra note 90.
In May 2021, FDA released guidance on internal BCIs designed for patients with paralysis
or amputated limbs. The document explicitly places “[n]on-implanted BCI devices” beyond
its scope. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPLANTED BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACE (BCI) DEVICES
FOR PATIENTS WITH PARALYSIS OR AMPUTATION—NON-CLINICAL TESTING AND CLINICAL
CONSIDERATIONS 3 (2021) .
94
See Wexler & Reiner, supra note 10, at 2.
95
POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES, supra note 17, at 2 (“CDRH does not intend to examine
low risk general wellness products to determine whether they are devices within the meaning
of the FD&C Act or, if they are devices, whether they comply with the premarket review and
post-market regulatory requirements for devices under the FD&C Act . . . .”).
96
Guidance Documents (Medical Devices and Radiation-Emitting Products), FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatoryassistance/guidance-documents-medical-devices-and-radiation-emitting-products
[https://perma.cc/YCS4-KX89].
97
POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES, supra note 17, at 5.
98
Id. at 5–6.
93
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inflexible or simply ill-suited to the problem they are meant to address.99 This
is the so-called pacing problem: Technologies left unregulated can lead to
concrete harms, yet regulation can lag behind innovation, hindering it. 100 For
some policymakers and scholars, this lag is reason enough to avoid the pacing
problem altogether. Instead, they propose, regulators (particularly
government agencies) should leave companies alone until there is concrete
evidence that a given technology is harmful. 101
Theirs is an attractive proposal when a technology promises
incredible benefits, as BCIs do. If companies lack the room to experiment,
they may not develop life-changing devices for people with muscle control
issues, lost limbs, or chronic health conditions. Because a single type of BCI
could be put to many uses—a mobility tool for some people and
entertainment for others, say—companies who are not cowed by the risks
inherent in government regulatory pressure are likely to see BCIs as a solid
investment. A BCI gaming controller could trend among able-bodied
influencers and allow gamers with mobility challenges to play games that
lack built-in accessibility options.102 There are also more controversial
benefits to delaying regulation of emerging technologies, such as unhindered
market growth. 103 For those who argue that people are generally willing to
trade their privacy for more personalized goods and services, the richer,
larger datasets that minimally regulated technologies produce are a
noteworthy benefit.104
There is a significant possibility that BCIs will go unregulated even
with consensus that some regulation is necessary. As political scientists have
chronicled since the dawn of that profession, even highly salient problems
can go unaddressed.105 This is not to say that government action is a cure-all.

99

Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy
and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, RICHMOND L.J. & TECH 2–3 (2015)
(observing that regulation of emergent technology “is likely to be premature and overly
rigid” and proposing that Internet of Things devices should not be subjected to “prophylactic
restrictions” absent “clear evidence of direct risk to health or property”).
100
See Araz Taeihagh, M. Ramesh & Michael Howlett, Assessing the Regulatory Challenges
of Emerging Disruptive Technologies, 15 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 1009, 1009 (2021).
101
See, e.g., Thierer, supra note 99.
102
See Antonio Regalado, supra note 7; see also Our Work, ABLE GAMERS,
https://ablegamers.org/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/WGW9-DEAX] (last visited Feb. 6,
2022) (“We work within the industry to enable developers to create adaptive gaming
solutions, design more inclusive games, and create events that are accessible to people with
disabilities.”).
103
See Thierer, supra note 99, at 14.
104
Id. at 57.
105
There are multiple theories that attempt to explain this phenomenon. See generally TANYA
HEIKKILA & PAUL CAIRNEY, COMPARISON OF THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS, THEORIES
OF THE POLICY PROCESS (Christopher M. Weible & Paul A. Sabatier eds., 4th ed. 2018).
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The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 106 prevented the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from regulating most commercial
chemicals for decades.107 Although the 2016 Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical
Safety for the 21st Century Act 108 overhauled the law, the EPA now has a
huge backlog of chemicals to test. 109 Even if Congress and an agency are not
at cross-purposes, the very structure of federal agencies could get in the way
of regulatory efforts. It is not entirely clear, for example, which agency
should take the lead on regulating consumer neurotechnology. 110
I do not dispute that regulation should be targeted to specific problems
that emergent technology poses. 111 Few would contend that general
regulations that blanket everything and everyone without recourse to any
cost-benefit analysis are a worthwhile endeavor. I do, however, suggest that
waiting until concrete harms appear is not a great answer to the pacing
problem in the context of especially high-potential, high-risk technologies
such as BCIs.
Social media is a clear example of a disruptive technology left largely
unregulated until it matured into a ubiquitous presence in most people’s
lives.112 Reasonable people may disagree on whether individual social media
users or “Twitter mobs” indicate a market failure. What is unsettling to many,
I gather, is that the self-regulation of the industry’s early days now takes the
form of a handful of massive companies calling the shots. For some, this state

106

Summary of the Toxic Substances Control Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-toxic-substances-control-act [https://perma.cc/JX2F-S3R2] (last
updated June 2016).
107
Mark Scialla, It Could Take Centuries for EPA to Test All The Unregulated Chemicals
Under a New Landmark Bill, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 22, 2016, 11:58 AM EST)
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/it-could-take-centuries-for-epa-to-test-all-theunregulated-chemicals-under-a-new-landmark-bill [https://perma.cc/UJA4-KAJA].
108
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114–128, 130
Stat. 448–513 (2016).
109
Scialla, supra note 107.
110
See Taeihagh, Ramesh & Howlett, supra note 100, at 1009.
111
See Thierer, supra note 99, at 2–3:
The better alternative to top-down regulation is to deal with concerns
creatively as they develop, using a combination of educational efforts,
technological empowerment tools, social norms, public and watchdog
pressure, industry best practices and self-regulation, transparency, and
targeted enforcement of existing legal standards (especially torts), as
needed” but noting that “if enough people are attempting to modify their
bodies or enhance various human capabilities, it may become very difficult
for the law to keep up.
112
Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media, Knight First
Amendment Institute at 2 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-toregulate-and-not-regulate-social-media [https://perma.cc/B94D-PYSM].
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of affairs is nothing less than dire threat to democratic institutions. 113 Even if
you dispute such a conclusion, it seems fair to say that regulators are
struggling mightily to bring the social media giants to heel after letting them
run free for years.114
Consumer BCIs might not be the next technology to fundamentally
change how we interact with one another and how we see ourselves, but the
curious evolution of social media indicates that waiting to regulate would be
a great risk.115 None of this is to say that BCIs are doomed to bring us all pain
and turn us into a ruin of a species that will serve as a warning to all who
might bring their spaceships close to the perpetually smoldering rock that
used to be Earth. (Though that is always a possibility.) Regulation can be
appropriate when technology presents a direct risk to a subset of humanity
rather than the entire planet.
Even if BCIs fail to follow social media as an era-defining
technology, regulation may be needed to avoid deepening existing inequities.
The “emerging technology narrative” envisions all of society changing, all at
once. Yet many technological advances reach the wealthy long before
marginalized communities. Developers of consumer technologies often
target privileged populations when making design, infrastructure, and
marketing decisions. 116 In this way products which may have had widespread
utility are rendered largely inaccessible to people who are not a member of a
privileged population.117
Technology like the IpsiHand or a thought-to-text software could
mean a lot to someone who seeks more control over how they interact with
their environment. Such devices should not be available only to those who
can afford to pay astronomical sums. Similarly, companies may treat
“disabled” people only as potential customers rather than collaborators.
Devices devised by the “able-bodied” may not meet the actual needs and
113

Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 71, at 110–11 (warning that tech CEOs seem to have
more power over American lives than elected representatives and that AI-powered software
gives technology companies the ability to undermine or even displace government
regulation).
114
See, e.g., Bobby Allyn, Judge Allows Federal Trade Commission’s Latest Suit Against
Facebook to Move Forward, NPR (Jan. 11, 2022, 5:10 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/
2022/01/11/1072169787/judge-allows-federal-trade-commissions-latest-suit-againstfacebook-to-move-forw [https://perma.cc/PY6A-89XB].
115
See Balkin, supra note 112, at 9.
116
See Courtney R. Lyles, Robert M. Wachter & Urmimala Sarkar, Focusing on Digital
Health Equity, 326 JAMA 1795, 1795 (2021) (arguing that digital health tools are deepening
health inequities because they “are developed with homogeneous, highly educated, and
advantaged populations in mind”).
117
Id. (“despite the ability to leverage technology to design apps in multiple languages or
with audiovisual features to support both personalization and accessibility, most available
digital health tools are available in English only and are written at high reading levels”).
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wants of their intended users. People may not wish to change themselves in
order to realize a range of mobility, mental capacity, or mode of
communication labeled “normal.” 118 Early regulatory intervention—
government or industry—could prevent such exclusionary feedback loops
and encourage more equitable innovation. 119
2. The Internet of Things Requires New Approaches to Data Protection
Targeted, early regulatory intervention of BCIs may sound like a tall
order with little chance of being filled. But BCI regulation need not be BCI
specific. Currently available consumer BCIs may offer unique benefits, but
their risks are largely the same as other Internet of Things (IoT) and AI
devices. Of course, this does not mean that regulating IoT and AI devices as
a group is any more straightforward than regulating BCIs in particular.
Many IoT and AI devices present data privacy risks. Consequently,
they trigger the pacing problem—regulate now, and potentially stifle
innovation, or regulate later, potentially violating strongly held societal
privacy norms?120
Like social media, the Internet of Things has been described as
another tech advance that proliferated before any serious regulatory efforts. 121
Wearable technology and now-familiar home assistants such as Alexa collect
amounts of data that could be orders of magnitude beyond what consumers

See Community and Culture—Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ASSOC. DEAF:
The deaf and hard of hearing community is diverse. There are variations
in how a person becomes deaf or hard of hearing, level of hearing, age of
onset, educational background, communication methods, and cultural
identity. How people “label” or identify themselves is personal and may
reflect identification with the deaf and hard of hearing community, the
degree to which they can hear, or the relative age of onset.
https://www.nad.org/resources/american-sign-language/community-and-culture-frequently
-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/2LRA-M62Y] (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
119
Lyles et. al, supra note 116, at 1796 (“Building and testing tools in the populations who
need and can benefit from them offer the best opportunity to ensure that the health care digital
revolution improves health equity. Also needed is intentional implementation that carefully
leverages in-person support and builds from trusted relationships.”)
120
For a fuller discussion of privacy law and theories, see subsection 3, How the “Privacy
Narrative” Influences BCI Risk Assessment, infra.
121
See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 92 (2014) (“[IoT
devices] are not a science-fiction future but a present reality. Internet of Things devices have
proliferated before we have had a chance to consider whether and how best to regulate
them.”).
118
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believe they are sharing. 122 Some consumer BCIs produce data that provide
minimal information about who their users are, their preferences, or their
health. But data that reveals little on its own can, when combined with other
data, give rise to accurate inferences (or inaccurate, biased ones) about
sensitive information that most people would think twice before sharing. 123
Taken together, consumer IoT devices are part of an impossibly massive and
impossibly rich dataset. 124
IoT is not a definition so much as a shorthand reference for a big
group of devices (things) that share one basic characteristic: access to the
internet.125 With few, if any, exceptions, consumer BCIs share brain data over
the internet with other devices or cloud storage servers.126 Muse, a “mediation
headband” with EEG functionality, works with a smartphone app that gives
users “real-time feedback” by playing different weather sounds depending on
their “mental state.”127 The team behind the now defunct Melon, another
consumer EEG headband company, promised that the Melon device would
“improve your focus in relation to your activity, your environment, your
emotions, and any other behavior you want to track.” 128 And with few, if any,
exceptions, both consumer and research BCIs use AI to translate brain signals
into outputs like moving a computer cursor.129
There is also emerging evidence that most methods of anonymizing
and pseudonymizing data can be reversed. 130 Some scholars predict a world

Jane Kirtley & Scott Memmel, Rewriting the “Book of the Machine”: Regulatory and
Liability Issues for the Internet of Things, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 455, 466 (2018) (noting
that IoT devices collect various kinds of sensitive data, including health data, and aggregate
it, creating exceptionally rich data sets).
123
Id.
124
Peppet, supra note 121.
125
Id. at 92.
126
Marcello Ienca, Pim Haselager & Ezekiel J Emanuel, supra note 16.
127
MUSE, supra note 12.
128
Melon: A Headband and Mobile App to Measure Your Focus, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/806146824/melon-a-headband-and-mobile-app-tomeasure-your-fo [https://perma.cc/B2LP-NT85] (last visited Jan. 20, 2022). Melon is no
longer available.
129
Wolkenstein, Jox & Friedrich, supra note 38, at 639.
130
Peppet, supra note 121, at 98 (health), 100 (wearable sensors), 102 (“epidermal
electronics”), 103 (implantables), 108 (smart home), 111 (employee sensors), 115
(smartphone sensors—mood sensing). Without mentioning BCIs as a category, Peppet does
list the Melon and Muse headsets as examples of IoT devices and the potential ability of
smartphone sensors to pick up information about the user’s mood and health. Id. at 88 n.11.
See also Michelle M. Christovich, Why Should We Care What Fitbit Shares?: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to Protect Sensitive Personal Fitness Information, 38 HASTINGS
COMMC’N & ENT. L.J. 91, 109–10 (2015) (discussing wearable fitness tracker
manufacturers’ privacy policies with regard to identifying data).
122
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where employers use the data from wearables to monitor their employees. 131
This could turn wearable manufacturers into de facto credit reporting
agencies, which would bring them within the ambit of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.132
Currently, regulatory efforts to control both legal and illegal forms of
data collection and sharing tend to focus on protecting personal information.
A conventional mode of protecting personal information rests on the idea of
voluntary informed consent. 133 As we generate increasing amounts of data
across an expanding number of devices, however, truly informed and
voluntary consent has become nearly impossible to achieve. When was the
last time you read through a privacy policy or end user license agreement
before clicking or tapping “agree”? 134 There is often little reason to spend the
time, as declining the terms and conditions means that you cannot use the
product that you just bought. 135 To make matters more complex, few
131

Peppet, supra note 121, at 127– 28; Alexandre Gonfalonieri, What Brain-Computer
Interfaces Could Mean for the Future of Work, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/10/what-brain-computer-interfaces-could-mean-for-the-future-of-work
[https://perma.cc/4QQM-F6GA].
132
Peppet, supra note 121, at 126–27:
The FTC has warned mobile-application developers that if they provide
information to employers about an individual's criminal history, for
example, they may be providing consumer reports and thus regulated by
the FCRA. By analogy, if a consumer sensor company such as Fitbit began
to sell their data to prospective employers or insurance companies, the
FTC could take the position that Fitbit had become a CRA [(consumer
reporting agency)] under the FCRA. If a company such as Fitbit were
classified as a CRA, consumers would have the right to dispute the
accuracy of any information provided by such a CRA. If Internet of Things
manufacturers were not deemed CRAs, but instead deemed to be providing
information to CRAs—such as established credit-reporting firms or data
aggregators—the FCRA would forbid Internet of Things firms from
knowingly reporting inaccurate information and would require that such
firms correct and update incomplete or incorrect information.
133
Anita L. Allen, An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s Own Informational Privacy? 64 ALA.
L. REV. 845, 847, 856 (2013) (discussing the modern approach to digital information sharing
as “great privacy give-away” and offering the possibility that protecting one’s own
informational privacy is a self-regarding duty).
134
Marcus Moretti & Michael Naughton, Why Privacy Policies Are So Inscrutable, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/whyprivacy-policies-are-so-inscrutable/379615/ [https://perma.cc/N2HW-MZUV] (suggesting
that even if consumers wanted to read through all of those privacy policies, they likely
wouldn’t have the time).
135
Graham Johnson, Privacy and the Internet of Things: Why Changing Expectations
Demand Heightened Standards, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 345, 354 (2019) (discussing end
user adhesion contracts for IoT products: “[C]onsumers are presented with a ‘choice,’ but
that choice is little more than the manufacturer stating ‘take it or leave it’—either accept the
terms of use, or don’t use the product.”)
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wearables have screens large enough to allow the user to read the monstrously
large walls of text that make up modern privacy policies. 136 The privacyminded consumer must navigate to a webpage or link the IoT device to an
app on a smartphone or computer if they want to read that wall of text. 137
These issues with a consent-based approach to protecting personal
information may not mean much for future regulatory efforts that encompass
BCIs. Some scholars contend that most consumers do voluntarily consent to
companies using and sharing their data.138 After all, many people post
intimate details about their lives on the internet and purchase devices with the
express purpose of generating data about themselves.139
Other scholars reply, however, that most consent is inadequate
because few companies tell consumers much about their data collection,
storage, and sharing policies.140 Even if the majority of consumers make
decisions that they believe are in line with their perceived interests, they may
have decided to share much less if they were aware of what was really being
shared.
Companies can, of course, require consumers to waive the rights to
their data by including a clause to that effect in the terms and conditions that
accompany their product or service. But the notion that a company can do
whatever it pleases with information it gathers from consumers, potentially
without their knowledge or express consent, is intuitively suspect. This is
especially so when the data is generated as a side effect of the consumer’s use
of the product or service, such as EEG data generated by a BCI headband. If
we have no choice but to allow companies to collect data about us—data that
might reveal personal information—can it be right that we have no say in
how that data is used or stored? It is difficult to argue that consumers are
forced, in the strict sense of the term, to use IoT devices. There are plenty of
devices on the market, BCIs among them, that are unnecessary. Yet few of
us could get by without a phone or a computer, as most employers require
employees to be available via phone, email, or both. Many workplaces rely
136

Moretti & Naughton, supra note 129.
Peppet, supra note 121, at 141 (surveying various IoT products’ privacy policies).
138
Thierer, supra note 99, at 68 (contending that privacy is subjective and noting that people
routinely share personal information about themselves, suggesting that they have decided
that the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs).
139
Id.; see also Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and
Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 52 (2008) (“Why would anyone want to make a
multimedia record of her entire life? The answer may be that our experiences and
achievements comprise our uniqueness; preserving a record of them preserves a record of
us.”).
140
Thierer, supra note 99, at 68; Christovich, supra note 130, at 105. See also Manheim &
Kaplan, supra note 71, at 131–33 (working from the assumption that privacy contributes to
the maintenance of strong democratic institutions, arguing that consumers have acquiesced
to privacy invasions because they feel that they lack control over their data).
137

Vol. 7:2]

Mind Games

413

on remote work applications such as Microsoft Teams and G Suite or
electronic employee management systems. One can argue that technology
companies do give consumers some control over what is done with data that
contains their personal information with, for example, those cookie alert
menus.141 For complex IoT devices such as BCIs, however, the data may be
difficult for most consumers to interpret. 142 Accordingly, issues with a
consent-based approach to protecting personal information actually mean a
great deal for future regulatory efforts that encompass BCIs.
One approach to the intertwined issues of consent and ownership is
for data subjects to have complete control over any data that includes
information about them. This would mean that companies would have to ask
consumers for their data, not simply for their consent. The practical
challenges with such an approach to consumer data are easy to see. Even if
there were a simple way to automatically transfer data from corporate cloud
servers, cell sites, and the like, it would be nearly impossible for most people
to store even a fraction of the data their IoT devices generate. Then there is
medical data, surveillance camera footage, and all of the other data that nonconsumer IoT devices generate. Who would have the time (or knowledge) to
manage all of that? The privacy policies and terms and conditions agreements
we are all familiar with could reemerge in short order. If legal control passed
to consumers, but not actual control of the data, enforcement would be nearly
impossible. Consumers would have little incentive to press isolated incidents
of impermissible data usage, if they were even aware of them, but companies
would have strong incentives to devise artful means of securing access to as
much data as possible.
Still, this approach could be effective in limited circumstances. Some
Indigenous scholars and activists have advocated data sovereignty—the
transfer of legal ownership and control of all Indigenous data to Native
nations.143 Acknowledging the practical difficulties, they argue that the call
141

See Emily Stewart, Why Every Website Wants You to Accept Its Cookies, VOX: RECODE
(Dec. 10, 2019, 8:00 AM EST), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/10/18656519/whatare-cookies-website-tracking-gdpr-privacy [https://perma.cc/4MAD-6BKL].
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See Anastasia Greenberg, supra note 53, at 109:
In a BMI with 24 channels and with a sampling rate (i.e., rate of data
collection) of 200 Hz, there will be over 17 million data points for just one
hour of BMI use. In that case, if a data subject requests access to their brain
data, not only will it be practically impossible for an ordinary individual
to make any sense of the information, they will unlikely have the disk
space on their computer to download the data in the first place.
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About Us, UNITED STATES INDIGENOUS DATA SOVEREIGNTY NETWORK,
https://usindigenousdata.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/E99B-HHZ6] (last visited Feb. 6,
2022) (“Indigenous data sovereignty is the right of a nation to govern the collection,
ownership, and application of its own data. It derives from tribes’ inherent right to govern
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for data sovereignty follows naturally from their enduring struggle to restore
land and resources to Indigenous governance. 144 For these scholars and
activists, data is not merely inert property but a vessel of cultural and
biological knowledge; it is of them, rather than about them.145
3. How the “Privacy Narrative” Influences BCI Risk Assessment
The variety of relationships we humans have with the data we
generate makes the question of managing privacy risks difficult. Above, I
discussed how consumer BCIs cannot do much more “mind-reading” than a
mood ring. Even with this information, it can be difficult to stop thinking
about the monkey playing Pong, a commercially available thought-to-text
device, and people spying on the innermost workings of your mind (as you
think about the monkey). For his part, Musk has suggested that Neuralink
may one day make human-AI symbiosis possible.146 For many people,
especially those familiar with the Borg from Star Trek, the idea of merging
humans and AI may be startling and scary. Even if you are the type of science
fiction fan who likes the idea of becoming a human-AI hybrid, you might
have a few questions about how it would actually work. When it comes to
technology, humans tend to focus on the dramatic unknown. This focus can
get in the way of regulation that effectively balances both innovation and risk
management concerns.
Assessing competing risks can be tricky. When a grave harm is likely
to occur, it makes sense to ignore other, smaller risks and devote attention to
that grave harm. If you were to spot a wildfire off in the distance that was
threatening to consume your home, chances are good that you would want to
prepare for that fire rather than fix a leaky faucet. (No home, no faucet to fix.)
Even when a grave harm is unlikely, taking precautions against that grave
harm can feel more important than addressing a more likely, but relatively
minor, harm. Even if you were not sure that your home was in the path of the
fire, or that what you were looking at was even a fire, you might spend time
thinking about what you would do in the event of a fire instead of fixing the
leaky faucet.

their peoples, lands, and resources. This conception of data sovereignty positions Indigenous
nations’ activities to govern data within an Indigenous rights framework.”).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Nicole Wetsman, Elon Musk Trots Out Pigs in Demo of Neuralink Brain Implants, THE
VERGE (Aug. 28, 2020, 7:45 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/28/21406143/
elon-musk-neuralink-ai-pigs-demo-brain-computer-interface [https://perma.cc/HWZ4NS62].

Vol. 7:2]

Mind Games

415

Misleading advertising can harm BCI consumers.147 Like a leaky
faucet, which wastes water and could invite mold, it is a current problem with
clear harms. But more than a few BCI observers are warning of wildfire. The
media is full of recitations of Musk’s plans for Neuralink (like the one at the
beginning of this comment)148 and pieces with titles such as “The Brain
Implants That Could Change Humanity.” 149 A common refrain: Will my
thoughts stay my own?150 Early in 2021, ScienceNews asked its readers
whether they were concerned about how advances in neurotechnology might
affect them.151 Far and away, readers were worried about their privacy—both
their ability to control who accesses information about themselves and their
ability to make their own choices. One wrote ScienceNews that the idea of
someone remotely accessing a person’s brain was “absolutely terrifying”;
another said that they had “no wish/desire to become a zombie or a clone.” 152
Sensationalist? Maybe. Yet some neuroscientists, neuroethicists, and
neurolawyers (yes, they exist) have also expressed concerns about letting this
technology develop without clear boundaries to protect users’ privacy. 153
This mix of worries and questions—some fanciful, some pragmatic---can be
understood as a “privacy narrative.” Managing this narrative is perhaps the
most pressing challenge of BCI regulation at this stage of the technology’s
development. It is difficult to prepare for a fire if you do not know its velocity
or size—or whether it is on the horizon at all.
I now turn to a brief discussion of privacy law and theories to shed
light on the shape of the privacy narrative. The existence of a legal right to
privacy, whatever “privacy” means in practice, is well settled in the United
States. Since the middle of the 20th century, the Court has incorporated most
of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment.
Before incorporation, no part of the Bill of Rights was enforceable against
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the states—it only bound the federal government. 154 The Court has also made
use of the controversial notion of substantive due process to protect other
fundamental rights that are not expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. 155 For a time,
substantive due process was explained in terms of privacy. 156 In Griswold v.
Connecticut, Justice Douglas reasoned that the Constitution protected an
unenumerated right to privacy on the ground that such a right fell within the
overlapping “penumbras” of certain enumerated rights.157 Although the Court
has since moved away from the idea that the unenumerated rights that the
Constitution protects emanate from the right of privacy, the existence of a
constitutionally protected right to privacy has rarely been seriously
questioned.
The content of that right is subject to near-constant questioning. The
United States is home to many and sundry definitions of privacy, some of
which overlap. The sources of privacy law also overlap—but only to a degree.
Privacy, in its multiple forms, is protected by various parts of the United
States Constitution, federal and state statutes, federal and state regulation, and
various industry standards, both binding and voluntary. Some of these
sources of law bind the government, some bind private actors, and some bind
both.
Some statutes and regulations limit certain third parties from sharing
information we, willingly or unwillingly, share with them. Despite efforts
both within and without Congress, there is no federal statute that protects
individuals’ privacy across the board. Instead, there are a series of industryspecific statutes, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA).158 In addition, a handful of states have more comprehensive
154

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–66 (1961) (overturning precedent by holding that
Fourth Amendment protections are enforceable against the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Some have argued that Substantive Due Process, even if justified by the structure of the
Constitution and precedent, is a dangerous doctrine because it invites the Justices to go on
fishing expeditions to find unenumerated rights in the constitution that match their own
beliefs and policy preferences. This argument is a particularly common rejoinder to Roe v.
Wade, Casey v. Planned Parenthood, and Hobby Lobby. See Nathan S. Chapman & Kenji
Yoshino, Common Interpretation: The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, NAT’L
C ONST . C TR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/
amendment-xiv/clauses/701 [https://perma.cc/FG7D-H66D] (last visited Feb. 6, 2022)
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history).
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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Chapman & Yoshino, supra note 155.
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The HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/
index.html [https://perma.cc/E6X7-8BGN] (last updated December 7, 2021); see also Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/
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privacy statutes. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also protects
consumer privacy insofar as disclosures of personal information are the result
of unfair or deceptive trade practices.159 FTC enforcement actions for Internet
of Things (IoT) security breaches demonstrate that the FTC could mount
similar actions against BCI manufacturers without changing its approach. 160
As discussed above, IoT devices put pressure on traditional notions
of personal information, voluntary consent, and ownership.161 There is an
emerging consensus that existing privacy law is unsuited for the complexities
of modern data, particularly the growth of IoT and AI technologies. Since
BCIs are part of the larger categories of IoT and AI, they inspire many of the
same privacy concerns as more familiar technologies, such as Alexa. 162 As
noted privacy scholar Anita Allen has argued, the advent of the digital age
brought a torrent of tricky privacy issues. 163 Do we have an ethical duty to
protect our own privacy? 164 If so, how can we protect our privacy in a “Big
Data economy?”165
Adding thoughts to the mix seems to make tricky privacy issue
trickier. Nita Farahany has written extensively on the potential challenges of
squaring the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, among
other sources of law, with potential future technologies that render thoughts
and involuntary mental processes accessible to others.166 Some
neuroethicists, meanwhile, have argued that products already available to
consumers present clear privacy risks because they are at once rich sources
of personal information and vulnerable to “brain hacking.” 167
phlp/publications/topic/hipaa.html#one [https://perma.cc/JSG5-FZH7] (last updated
Sept. 14, 2018) (“(HIPAA) is a federal law that required the creation of national standards to
protect sensitive patient health information from being disclosed without the patient’s
consent or knowledge.”).
159
See Business Guidance: Privacy and Security, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/privacy-and-security [https://perma.cc/A4ZM-DD7F] (last visited
Feb. 6, 2022) (offering advice for business owners to help them meet their legal obligations
regarding consumer privacy and avoid FTC enforcement actions).
160
Kirtley & Memmel, supra note 122, at 473-81.
161
Anastasia Greenberg, supra note 53, at 94 (classifying consumer BCIs as IoT devices).
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See generally, Anne Pfeifle, Comment, Alexa, What Should We Do About Privacy?
Protecting Privacy for Users of Voice-Activated Devices, 93 WASH. L. REV. 421 (2018)
(examining privacy considerations by highlighting the use of Amazon’s Alexa device).
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Allen, supra note 133.
165
Allen, supra note 163.
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A. Farahany, The Costs of Changing Our Minds, 69 EMORY L. J. 75 (2019). For an excellent
summary of Farahany’s work and comparisons with other scholars, circa 2013, see Shen,
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“Thought privacy” is not as novel an idea as it sounds. It is not limited
to fiction, either. In the 1928 U.S. Supreme Court case Olmstead v. United
States, Chief Justice Taft held that a particular instance of government
wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the government
agents in question did not physically trespass on the petitioners’ property but
merely recorded a conversation, from a distance, into which the petitioner
voluntarily entered.168 Justice Brandeis dissented, returning to an argument
that he and Samuel Warren made in their famous 1890 article The Right to
Privacy.169 Urging the majority to consider the future effect of their holding,
he warned:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping.
Ways may someday be developed by which the Government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in
the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it be that
the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions
of individual security?170
In The Right to Privacy, Justice Brandeis and Warren argued for the
existence of a right, found in the common law rather than the Constitution,
“of determining, ordinarily, to what extent [one’s] thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others.” 171
Such concerns fall into the “informational privacy” category. 172 They
focus on thoughts as a type of data that can be collected, analyzed,
transferred, and stored.173 Connecting brains and computers has given rise to
another category of privacy concerns, however. It is possible to understand
thoughts as more than something we “own” or can exercise control over, like
other kinds of data. Our thoughts are also part of us. They play a large role in
how we perceive our own consciousness and interpret reality. A device that
“writes,” or makes changes to, the brain may qualify as interference with

168

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. R. 193 (1890).
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and Information Technology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta , ed.)
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“decisional privacy.”174 So too may a device that only “reads” the brain but
uses AI to do so. 175 Complex AI algorithms employ predictive decisionmaking that humans usually cannot track.176 If a device has multiple intricate
functions, it may be difficult to tell whether the user is directing the AI or
whether the AI is directing the user. 177
The concept of decisional privacy, present in U.S. Supreme Court
cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, lacks a consistent scope and
definition. In general, it covers the notion that there are certain decisions that
individuals should be able to make for themselves without interference. 178
Another possible label for decisional privacy is “autonomy,” though that term
is also difficult to pin down.179
These queries about how machines that connect brains to computers
may challenge established boundaries of informational and decisional
privacy form a powerful, urgent narrative. Accessing thoughts seems to be a
major threshold in human development. Even though the technology is still
in its early stages, the stakes feel high and personal. Haven’t we seen this play
out in countless novels, movies, and video games? Technology that becomes
sentient and turns on humanity—or makes us turn on our friends and family?
Some (likely many) people may be unwilling to ride the hype train
that far. Even in the likely event that society does not descend into chaos
caused by sentient implants or cyborgs, the ability to peer into someone’s
thoughts does seem poised to change how we interact with one another in
profound ways, as social media did. The potentially transformative effects of
this technology—though people will certainly disagree on what exactly those
effects might be—keeps the “privacy narrative” relevant. Brain-computer
communication may end up in history’s dustbin alongside flying cars. But for
now, the technology will continue to inspire reflection and action in people
who have concluded, whether based on critically analyzed facts or gut
instinct, that this technology really is the future. If some of those people are

See generally Drew, supra note 28, (noting ethicists’ concerns about these technologies’
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179
See generally John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/
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regulators, they are going to have sort out which risks are worth addressing
and which are too distant to be worth expending time and money on.
Sorting through these potential risks may be a Sisyphean task.
Because the technology is still developing, there is not much empirical data
that clearly supports conclusions about which privacy risks are realistic in the
short term, which are realistic in the long term, and which are confined to the
worlds of science fiction. In addition, many concerns are informed by
normative judgments about the proper role of technology in society and the
importance of distributing technological benefits and harms equitably. It may
be reasonable to assume that many people would not like Elon Musk alone
to decide how humanity should advance—even if they share in his desire to
one day achieve human-AI symbiosis. But the hyper-polarization that typifies
current politics, coupled with widespread distrust of expertise, strongly
suggest that consensus on the best way forward will be monstrously hard to
achieve. And even if the elected officials of the United States were able to
reach consensus, or at least a workable compromise, those who hold only a
small share of global power, both within and without the United States, would
likely find themselves left out of the conversation. Truly “effective”
regulation, I suggest, must attempt to address these moral and ethical
challenges.
With that in mind, it is still possible to consider the interplay between
the privacy narrative and the existing regulatory models. An outsize focus on
the privacy narrative would probably lead to inefficient, wasteful regulation.
BCIs have only just started leave research labs. In addition, the narrative
incorporates a very broad definition of privacy that encompasses concrete
worries about data protection (informational privacy) as well as concerns,
which are potentially more intangible, about autonomy and identity
(decisional privacy). It also overshadows leaky faucet issues with consumer
product safety and marketing, which could be left unaddressed.180 Francis
Shen, using the term “mental privacy panic” to refer to the same general
concept I call the “privacy narrative,” cautions those who would let mindreading fears influence policymaking. 181 The problem is not what current
neuroscience technologies can do, he contends, but how various actors can
“(mis)use[] and (mis)interpret[]” brain data. 182
Yet ignoring the narrative entirely could lead to regulation that fails
to take into account the ways in which that narrative impacts how people will
interact with BCIs. The near-future development trajectory of BCI
technology is largely unknown. The privacy narrative may very well
180
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encompass risks that do come to pass. As Shen argues, when we have brain
data, we (everyone—the government, industry actors, consumers) should
take care to stick to the science. Since the P300 signal does not offer much
information about someone’s memory, for example, P300-based “lie
detectors” should not be allowed to proliferate. 183 But not every concern
within the privacy narrative may qualify as a misinformation-fueled panic.
In the next section, I discuss how Bryan Casey and Mark A. Lemley’s
You Might Be A Robot offers a potential method for regulators to address the
privacy narrative.
II. LEARNING FROM ROBOTS
In Part I, I presented a bird’s-eye overview of BCI technology. I also
analyzed a privacy narrative—a discrepancy between the technology’s
current state and the type of privacy concerns that are routinely voiced in
writings and discussions about BCIs. I will now turn to Bryan Casey and
Mark A. Lemley’s article “You Might Be A Robot” and discuss how their
theory about defining “robot” helps shed light on regulating BCIs.
As I explained above BCIs they share many of the same general
privacy risks associated with other kinds of IoT and AI devices. Functional
criteria, by their nature, are focused on what something can do rather than
what something is—making it possible for one regulation to apply to multiple
kinds of devices at once. For the same reason, functional criteria have a better
chance of keeping up with the rate of technological change.
Regulating using functional criteria rather than definitions, as Casey
and Lemley propose, could help regulators protect against serious privacy
concerns without singling out BCIs, which could be wasteful and
unnecessarily inhibit innovation. Regulators may develop BCI-specific
regulation because the privacy narrative emphasizes the novelty of
interacting with the world using your thoughts alone. Elected officials, who
lack insulation from political processes and are incentivized to respond to
popular constituent concerns, are especially likely to adopt targeted
regulation (should BCIs become politically salient enough to garner
attention). But any regulator with limited knowledge of available BCI
technology could be drawn to the idea that protecting “thought privacy” is a
challenge that requires targeted action. BCI-specific regulation, in turn,
requires an answer to the question “what is a BCI?” As Casey and Lemley
show, definitional questions are both tough to answer and unlikely to result
in effective regulation.
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A. Of Robots and Humans (and Cyborgs): Bryan Casey and Mark A.
Lemley’s Argument
In You Might Be A Robot, Bryan Casey and Mark A. Lemley make
the case that trying to define robots in order to regulate them is often a losing
game.184 For their own purposes, they employ a subjective definition: a robot
is anything that can conceivably be called a robot. 185 Rules and statutes that
include definitions, they argue, are very likely to become outdated at an
astonishing pace.186 Even if a regulatory or statutory definition seems to stand
the test of time, it may be underinclusive, overinclusive, or both at once. 187
Acknowledging that definitions are sometimes impossible to avoid, they
advocate regulators asking whether defining “robot” is necessary as a
“threshold question.”188 “[W]henever possible,” they suggest, regulators
should “establish whether a potential regulated entity is a robot without
resorting to explicit, ex ante definitions.” 189 Instead of ex ante definitions,
regulators should consider functional criteria. 190 In doing so, they suggest that
the focus should be on regulating conduct rather than actors or things—
“verbs, not nouns.”191
184

Bryan Casey & Mark A. Lemley, You Might Be A Robot, 105 C ORNELL L. REV. 287, 293–
95 (2020) [hereinafter You Might Be A Robot].
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Id. at 296.
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Id. at 313.
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Id. at 315.
188
Id. at 341.
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Id.
190
Id. at 342:
Adopting functional criteria, as [Alan] Turing did, makes us less likely to
produce definitions that quickly become obsolete. And, unlike formal
definitions, the process is also less apt to provide adversaries with a
roadmap for gaming or abusing our legal rules. Perhaps even more
importantly, clearly establishing functional criteria can also help to reduce
confusion by judicial bodies that may subsequently rely on different
schools of interpretation to understand a definition. By signaling our
legislative intent through functional criteria, legislators and regulators can
reduce the likelihood of textualists and purposivists coming out on
opposite sides of a definitional debate. This isn’t just good legislative
hygiene, it’s also consistent with the general preference for standards, not
rules, when governing fast-changing technology.
191
Id. at 343:
A focus on conduct, not status, is a good idea for other reasons. It may help
us avoid discrimination against certain technologies or business models,
and ultimately avoid discrimination against robots. It will allow us to
accumulate knowledge and hone our definitions over time by giving us the
flexibility to change course as the technology changes. And, ultimately, it
may prevent unnecessary regulation by narrowing our legal rules to focus
on identified problems rather than creating regulations that apply across
the board to robots, whether we need them or not.
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Casey and Lemley do not make an argument for or against robot
regulation. Instead, they offer a pragmatic take with a somewhat dim (and
likely accurate) view of the policymaking process: Regulators will regulate,
whether doing so is wise or not, and there are plenty of policymakers who are
“untrained, unfamiliar, or unconcerned” with technological matters.192 For
Casey and Lemley, developing truly effective robot regulation is a fantasy.
Their goal is damage mitigation. In the absence of truly effective regulation,
“less bad” regulation is the next best thing. 193
Casey and Lemley’s top mitigation strategy: Avoid categorical
definitions wherever possible. In lieu of such definitions, regulation should
include functional criteria for determining whether an entity is or is not
subject to a given regulation. 194 They point out that functional criteria is
already a modus operandi of the common law and that the FTC has made use
of the idea with regard to privacy. 195 Because theirs is an article about robots,
Casey and Lemley call this strategy “Turing’s Razor”—a play on the
principle of Occam’s razor, which holds that one should use no more
assumptions than necessary to explain something. 196 Turing is Alan Turing,
a founder of modern computing and a greatly influential figure in the
development of artificial intelligence. As Casey and Lemley recount, Turing
proposed a functional criterion for deciding whether something qualified as
artificial intelligence: “if it behaves in a way indistinguishable from the way
intelligences behave,” it is intelligent. 197 Of note here is that Turing’s
criterion targets an action—behaving intelligently—rather than an actor. In
Casey and Lemley’s words, it targets a verb, not a noun.198 Regulating verbs
rather than nouns will generally work, they argue, because regulation is
usually prompted by functionality concerns rather than issues with the
regulated entity itself.199
A main benefit of Turing’s Razor is relative ease of enforcement.
Functional criteria, Casey and Lemley argue, can clarify regulations for the
judicial bodies tasked with enforcing them by signaling legislative intent.200
Turing’s Razor also offers protection against would-be regulation-dodgers.
Functional criteria are harder to avoid than categorical definitions. 201 On the
drafting side of things, Turing’s Razor may keep regulators from
192
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unnecessarily targeting particular technologies or potential but unproven
risks.202
Some regulators are better positioned to regulate verbs than others.
When FDA distinguishes between medical devices and wellness devices, the
agency is regulating nouns. Although that particular distinction is largely
discretionary, FDA’s mandate is noun-centric. The agency is responsible for
food, drugs (and devices), and cosmetics that fall within the ambit of the
definitions laid out in subchapter II of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act.203 The FTC, in contrast, has a verb-centric mandate. The Federal Trade
Commission Act gives the FTC authority to investigate and punish unfair
trade “acts or practices.”204 Even industry regulators may find themselves
beholden to definitions they cannot easily change. (Industry definitions
played a role in the Frigaliment case, which I briefly discuss in the next
section.)
In short, not every regulatory problem can be solved by thinking about
verbs. Casey and Lemley are aware of this and suggest guidelines for those
times when you really do need to define “robot.” They are also aware of the
distinct possibility that regulators will not change the way they regulate; their
guidelines work for those situations, too. First, they suggest using categories
rather than “a single overarching definition.” They note that categories can
serve a similar purpose to functional criteria in that they can make it harder
for entities to avoid regulation by squeezing into, or out of, a definition. 205 As
I mentioned supra, virtually no one in the BCI industry wants to deal with
expensive, time-consuming FDA premarket approval if they can help it. This
creates an incentive to frame BCIs as wellness devices, which are subjected
to much less regulatory scrutiny than medical devices.
Second, Casey and Lemley propose regulating rather than legislating
whenever possible. Government agencies have more room than legislatures
to craft flexible, temporary definitions. 206 Agencies can issue nonbinding
guidance documents to test the waters, and rules generally go through a
public notice and comment process. Casey and Lemley concede that agencies
are vulnerable to capture and that they may struggle to handle the “crosscutting nature of robots.”207 Indeed, much has been written on the challenges
that emerging technologies pose for the administrative state—both regulating
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them and using them.208 Yet the alternative to agency-industry cooperation is
no cooperation, which is not a recipe for effective regulation. Last, Casey and
Lemley advocate sunset clauses (i.e., expiration dates) and express
opportunities for revision in situations where a statutory definition is
unavoidable.209
If a statutory definition is avoidable, though, what sort of functional
criteria should take its place? Casey and Lemley stop short of proposing a
definitive set. The idea is not that a single test, like Turing’s, is applicable
across the board. Instead, they offer six criteria as a starting point: agenda;
automaticity; autonomy; agency; ability; and anthropomorphization. 210
“Agenda” is a consideration of the motives behind the development and
deployment of robots.211 “Automaticity” highlights the distinction between
robots that can accomplish tasks with no human intervention—fully
autonomous robots—versus “autonomish” robots that require some
intervention.212 This distinction becomes important, Casey and Lemley
argue, in contexts where human engagement changes the basic regulatory
question or automatic actions are considered more (or less) desirable than
human actions.213 Similar to “automaticity,” “autonomy” is a consideration
of “the extent to which an entity is empowered to make decisions.” 214
“Agency” concerns who, or what, should be held responsible for what a robot
does.215 “Ability” follows “agenda,” asking not what the intended goal of a
robot is but rather how that goal is achieved. Ability is very much not a
consideration of who or what entity has certain abilities—it concerns the
abilities themselves.216 (This goes directly to Casey and Lemley’s central
“regulate verbs, not nouns” idea.) Last but not least, “anthromorphization” is
a consideration of human reactions to robots. 217
B. What’s in a Name?

208

See, e.g., Ryan Calo & Danielle K. Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis
of Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L. J. 797 (2021); David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho,
Algorithmic Accountability in the Administrative State, 37 YALE J. REG. 800 (2020); CARY
COGLIANESE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE OF MACHINE LEARNING (2020)
(report to the Admin. Conf. of the U.S.), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/ Coglianese%20ACUS%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3SG-PJYP].
209
You Might Be A Robot, supra note 20, at 360.
210
Id. at 344.
211
Id. at 344–45.
212
Id. at 346.
213
Id. at 347.
214
Id. at 348.
215
Id. at 349.
216
Id. at 350–51.
217
Id. at 353–55.

426

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[May 2022

In tracing the development and wide variety of advances in robotics,
Casey and Lemley note that the boundaries between human and machine are
growing thinner—not because of robotics alone, but also because of what
they term “human augmentation”:
These boundary-blurring technologies include systems such
as Elon Musk’s “Neuralink,” MIT’s “Mind-Reading”
headsets, and even chip implants that can unlock doors or
generate passwords. They also include plant-robot cyborgs
that can move themselves toward needed sunlight. The end
goal of these “cyborg” or “cybot” applications? To turn
human bodies into computers.218
I would counter that not every BCI can be comfortably explained as
a means of turning the human body into a computer—even those that do seem
to fit the term “human augmentation.” Some can conceivably be called
“human augmentation,” others “robots,” while still others seem to defy both
terms. The IpsiHand BCI that FDA approved as a therapy for stroke patients
seems more like a computer helping humans regain lost biological function
rather than a computer seeking to replace that biological function. (Maybe
that means it is a robot, using Casey and Lemley’s subjective definition.) It
does change the way the user’s brain works, but it does so to help put the user
back where they were before the stroke—does that count as human
augmentation? Or are such devices, even if they employ AI, a different kind
of technology? My quibble with Casey and Lemley’s categorization proves
their main point. With “boundary-blurring” technologies like robots and BCIs
(subjectively defined), resisting their ineffability is futile.
To the extent that BCIs and robots can be distinguished, would-be
BCI regulators arguably have additional definitional challenges beyond those
that would-be robot regulators face if they seek to develop BCI-specific
regulation. As established in the Part I, at least some people are freaked out
by the idea of a device that could read their minds. Philosophers and neuroscholars, to say nothing of generalist regulators, cannot agree on what exactly
the mind is.219 It necessarily follows that there will be ample disagreement
over what exactly a mind-reading device is. I argued that consumer BCIs do
not read minds in any traditional sense of the term “mind,” but someone who
holds that all brain activity is mind activity will heartily disagree with me. Is
a Muse headband, which tracks certain brain signals and provides a very basic
analysis of the user’s mood, a mind-reading device? Maybe a brain-reading
device? What about BCIs that alert users to impending epileptic seizures?220
Those devices definitely read the brain. Yet researchers found that some users
218
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experience significant changes in their identity and understanding of who
they are as a “self.”221
The law is full of definitional challenges. Most people who went
through law school will remember Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S.
International Sales, otherwise known as the “chicken case.” 222 Therein, the
esteemed Judge Henry Friendly tried his best to determine what two parties
to a contract meant by the word “chicken.”223 For a certain kind of
philosopher, no words have set meanings; “chicken” is at once everything
and nothing. For the rest of us, many words have one meaning, or a fixed
range of meanings. Accordingly, legal challenges to definitions are usually
about who gets to decide what a particular rule or statutory provision means
rather than what things actually are out there in the real world.
Robots and BCIs, however, are utterly nebulous concepts. Ask ten
people to describe a chicken, and you are likely to get ten fairly consistent
descriptions. Ask ten people to describe a robot—not so much. And if you
ask ten people to describe a BCI, you are likely to get at least one response
along the lines of “describe a what?”
BCIs may or may not be robots. But many contain robots, by at least
one definition—they employ AI to make up for fuzzy signals. Although the
specifics of the algorithm will surely differ between BCIs, the most common
decisional privacy concern—namely the fear of losing one’s identity or
ability to make one’s own choices—implicates the basic predictive feature of
machine learning. It follows that “verb-centric” regulation targeting
predictive behavior, even if not BCI-specific, is likely to address this
common privacy concern. Regulation of the use of predictive algorithms to
infer someone’s mood, for example, would capture both hyper-curated
advertising schemes and a BCI that zaps your brain when you are feeling sad.
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Of course, perfection is too much to hope for in the realm of
regulation. There is no guarantee that future BCIs will have enough overlap
with other machine learning applications to make that sort of rule feasible. In
the meantime, however, overlap is a near certainty. Questionable algorithms
are popping up everywhere, leading to increased calls for more scrutiny of
AI decision-making.224 If that scrutiny turned into verb-centric regulation,
BCIs would be covered.
The same is true, I argue, for regulation of consumer BCIs and the
Internet of Things (IoT). As technology stands now, there is a great deal of
overlap between BCIs and other IoT devices. Although the privacy narrative
emphasizes the mind as a site deserving special solicitude, verb-centric IoT
regulation is likely to prevent many of the informational privacy concerns in
the narrative. A rule requiring consumer IoT manufacturers to take
reasonable steps to safeguard their products from hackers trying to get users’
financial information will work for FitBits, Alexas, and Muses alike. That
said, regulators drafting such a rule may need to consider affect in some depth
because of the widespread understanding that there is something qualitatively
different about taking a PIN from FitBit data versus from BCI data. Leaning
into the language of intrusion and surveillance in public education materials
about general IoT hacking may be one way of minimizing the normative
differences between BCIs and other consumer IoT devices and so blunting
the impact of the privacy narrative’s emphasis on the mind.
C. Affect: A Functional Criterion for BCIs (and Beyond?)
Casey and Lemley contend that robots are particularly unruly subjects
of regulation because they tend to inspire strong emotional responses. 225 As
I discuss infra, this focus on our emotional connection to robots is one of
Casey and Lemley’s key insights—and one of the primary reasons their
argument is useful for thinking about BCIs.
Treating robots as either human or “dumb machines” for regulatory
purposes, Casey and Lemley write, strengthens implicit biases about the
motivations, abilities, and limitations of humanlike robots.226 Humans are
likely to assume that a humanlike robot will have the same motivations,
abilities, and limitations as a human. Progress in robotics, particularly AI, is
often measured in terms of humanness. It may be that some, if not most,
robotics experts are keenly aware that “advanced” robots need not bear a
resemblance to humans. But as Casey and Lemley note, there is no guarantee
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that regulatory experts are also robotics experts. 227 Even if a particular group
of regulatory experts are experts when it comes to a certain type of robot, that
robotics expertise is unlikely to be useful for very long given the rapid
development of new technology. 228 Efforts to increase cooperation between
agencies, industry and government regulators, and actors with different areas
of expertise are underway. Assuming their success, however, is a recipe for
ineffective regulation.229
Of the six criteria, all except automaticity are self-evidently
applicable to BCIs. By their nature, all BCIs include some level of human
involvement. They are not fully autonomous, even if they can perform some
functions—predicting what word a user is spelling, for example—
autonomously. To keep the “A” pattern going, I suggest affect as a
replacement for automaticity. Affect flows from the notion of agenda, which
Casey and Lemley describe as “the motives held by those deploying robots,
which presumably dictate the ends robots will serve.” 230 Affect is not motive,
but normative power stemming from emotional responses to new things. It
does not directly dictate what ends BCIs will serve, but it plays a role in how
and the degree to which those ends will be achieved. Affect often goes handin-hand with anthropomorphization, too. As Casey and Lemley argue, “[i]f
we subconsciously expect a robot to act like a human being, we will be
surprised and upset when it doesn’t, or when it makes mistakes that seem
bizarre to us.”231 One way to understand affect is as an extension of
anthropomorphization.
Affect is useful because regulating “verbs, not nouns” opens the
possibility of regulation that encompasses BCIs but make little reference, if
any, to thoughts or brain signals. Such regulation is desirable in theory for all
of the reasons discussed in this Part—but it may be ineffective if it does not
anticipate how people relate to BCIs. This anticipation does not require overt
references to thoughts or brain signals, of course. That would undermine the
benefits of the “verbs, not nouns” approach. The point of affect as a functional
criterion is, like anthropomorphization, to remind regulators that people bring
their prior experiences and beliefs into their interactions with technology. In
the particular context of BCIs, a focus on affect gives regulators dedicated
space to engage with the privacy narrative.
A robot example will serve my point here. In mid-2021, the New York
City Police Department unveiled “Digidog,” a roughly knee-height robotic
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entity that moves itself on four spindly legs. 232 The agenda: fighting crime.
The affect: terror. After a public outcry, the Department returned the “dog”
to its creator, Boston Dynamics. Then-Mayor Bill DiBlasio expressed relief
at this development, saying that the dog was “creepy, alienating, and sends
the wrong message to New Yorkers.”233 To the public, what the dog was
actually capable of mattered less than what it looked like it could do. Digidog
fell victim to the common bias against robots that subvert natural forms.
When something has four legs, is about knee height, and walks on its own
down a New York City street, most people would expect to see a furry pet—
not a lurching, headless thing with blinking LED lights. At the same time,
Digidog heightened the concerns of New Yorkers who saw the robot as
another means of unwelcome surveillance of their heavily policed
neighborhoods.234 Emotion-charged responses like these are important. They
can guide our sense of ethics and help us make connections between things
that appear disparate at first approach. The Department saw a tool that could
help save money and officers’ lives. The message received by people outside
the Department was that the police are overfunded and needlessly
militarized.235
Although adopting functional criteria will not solve the macro-level
structural challenges with regulation that I mentioned in Part I, it may help
diminish their consequences. In leading regulators to consider emotional
responses, affect makes room for conversations about biases—both biases
that people may have against certain technologies but also how certain
technologies exacerbate existing disparity-creating biases. Even though such
biases may not always be captured in empirical data, or reflect some
“objective” measure of reality, they should be considered real for regulatory
purposes because biases impact how we interact with technology and with
each other. In addition, members of marginalized communities whose life
experiences have given them anecdotal evidence of systemic bias against
them often lack access to the political capital and resources to support that
evidence with empirical data. The consequences of systemic bias can thus be
left out of regulatory cost-benefit analyses. This focus on the quantifiable can
hurt technologies, too, which may be on the receiving end of popular,
industry, or governmental biases but offer significant benefits.
The privacy narrative shows that this agenda-affect discrepancy is
also present in the BCI context. The Muse headband cannot tell you much
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about your thoughts or mood.236 But the device looks like something that can
decipher deep emotional states, at least to those people who are at all familiar
with science fiction, and the non-fine print strongly suggests as much. It also
looks like something that can be hacked. All this sounds like a false
advertising problem, which it is. But there is more to it. People looking for
money (or just creating chaos) are more likely to try to hack something that
(1) looks like it can be hacked and (2) looks like it collects information that
would be valuable to sell or hold for ransom. To put it another way, regulators
should be aware that BCIs are especially rich generators of narratives and that
at least some people are likely to act on the basis of at least some of those
narratives.
Affect in BCI regulation might include a more substantial accounting
of what conduct falls within “proper use” and “misuse” of a given product. It
could also take the form of details gleaned from outreach to an expanded pool
of stakeholders during the drafting process, or a presumption of action in
favor of vulnerable or underserved populations when there are multiple
courses of action available. Sometimes—perhaps often—regulators will fail
to consider how a rule, guidance document, or statutory provision impacts
particular communities. With BCIs, regulators (who are likely “able-bodied”)
are perhaps most at risk of overlooking “disabled” people’s views on the
devices.
CONCLUSION
This comment has investigated existing BCI technology, regulatory
challenges, and the potential application of Bryan Casey and Mark A.
Lemley’s ideas for regulating robots to BCI regulation. I have suggested that
BCIs, a varied group of devices, are both difficult to define and subject to a
“privacy narrative.” This narrative is a collection of worries and questions
surrounding the current abilities and development trajectory of BCIs which
appears in the media and in research alike. It complicates regulatory decisionmaking because BCI technology is still too new for us to know just how farfetched the idea of a mind-reading device is. Regulating verbs instead of
nouns, per Casey and Lemley’s argument, means choosing functional criteria
over definitions when attempting to regulate. I suggested the addition of
“affect” to their list as a means of cabining the influence of the privacy
narrative.
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